



UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov

| | | | | |
|--|-------------|----------------------|---------------------|------------------|
| APPLICATION NO. | FILING DATE | FIRST NAMED INVENTOR | ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. | CONFIRMATION NO. |
| 10/086,253 | 03/01/2002 | Barbara A. Rincavage | RINCAVAGE-1 | 4031 |
| 7590 | 09/03/2009 | | EXAMINER | |
| Eric A. LaMork P.O. Box 434 Yardley, PA 19067-8434 | | | RINES, ROBERT D | |
| | | | ART UNIT | PAPER NUMBER |
| | | | 3623 | |
| | | | MAIL DATE | DELIVERY MODE |
| | | | 09/03/2009 | PAPER |

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES

Ex parte BARBARA A. RINCAVAGE and CYNTHIA E. RINCAVAGE

Appeal 2009-004309
Application 10/086,253
Technology Center 3600

Decided: September 2, 2009

Before HUBERT C. LORIN, JOSEPH A. FISCHETTI, and
KEVIN F. TURNER, *Administrative Patent Judges*.

TURNER, *Administrative Patent Judge*.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF CASE

Appellants seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134 of the Final Rejections of claims 1-6 and 8-20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

SUMMARY OF THE DECISION

We AFFIRM.¹

THE INVENTION

Appellants' claimed invention relates to a method for tracking the proper execution of a medical prescription from the time it is prescribed by a physician to the time it is filled by a pharmacist and received by the recipient in the pharmacy. (Abstract).

Independent claim 12, which is deemed to be representative, reads as follows:

12. A method of verifying changes made by a pharmacist to medical prescriptions to reduce fraud and mistake in the filling of medical prescriptions, said method comprising the steps of:

entering unfilled prescription data into a secure database, wherein said unfilled prescription data corresponds to a patient's unfilled prescription for at least one pharmaceutical;

retrieving said unfilled prescription data from said database at a pharmacy;

having a pharmacist at said pharmacy fill said unfilled prescription, wherein said pharmacist exercises discretion to alter said prescription so that the filled prescription varies from said unfilled prescription data;

entering filled prescription data into said database, wherein said filled prescription data identifies said at

¹ Our decision will make reference to the Appellants' Appeal Brief ("Br.," filed Mar. 14, 2008) and the Examiner's Answer ("Ans.," mailed Apr. 04, 2008).

least one pharmaceutical and volume actually provided by said pharmacist as said filled prescription;
comparing said filled prescription data to said unfilled prescription data to identify discretion exercised by said pharmacist; and
generating a warning if said discretion exercised by said pharmacist is unjustified.

THE REJECTION

The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on appeal is:

| | | |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------|---------------|
| Keresman, III et al. ("Keresman") | 2001/0047281 A1 | Nov. 29, 2001 |
| Borsand et al. ("Borsand") | 2003/0074225 A1 | Apr. 17, 2003 |
| Denny ² | 2004/0107117 A1 | Jun. 03, 2004 |

The Examiner rejected claims 1-6, 8-9, and 12-18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Denny in view of Borsand. Additionally, claims 10-11 and 19-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Denny, Borsand and Keresman.

Rather than repeat the arguments of Appellants or the Examiner, we make reference to the Brief and the Answer for their respective details. Only those arguments actually made by Appellants have been considered in this decision. Arguments that Appellants did not make in the Brief have not been considered and are deemed to be waived. *See* 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii).

² For clarification, U.S. Pat. App. Pub. No. 2004/0107117 is properly spelled Denny.

ISSUES

1. Have Appellants shown Examiner erred in rejecting Claims 1-6, 8-9 and 12-18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Denny and Borsand?
2. Have Appellants shown that Examiner erred in rejecting Claims 10-11, and 19-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Denny, Borsand and Keresman?

FINDINGS OF FACT

The record supports the following findings of fact (FF) by at least a preponderance of the evidence. *In re Caveney*, 761 F.2d 671, 674 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (explaining the general evidentiary standard for proceedings before the Office).

Facts Related to Claim Construction

1. The disclosure contains no lexicographic definition of “justifiable” or “unjustifiable.”
2. The ordinary and customary meaning of “justifiable” is “to show to be right or valid.”³ Accordingly, “unjustifiable” is to show to be wrong or invalid.
3. The disclosure contains no lexicographic definition of “discretion.”
4. The ordinary and customary meaning of “discretion” is “freedom or power to act or judge on one’s own.”⁴

³ Webster’s II Dictionary 392 (3d ed. 2005).

⁴ Webster’s II Dictionary 207 (3d ed. 2005).

Denny

5. Denny is directed to “a prescription verification system [which] . . . receives prescription information including a prescribed drug intended to treat a condition associated with a patient.” ([0010]).

6. Denny describes prescription information as “a dosage level for the prescribed drug, the drug label contents and any applicable notes to be included on the bottle, a unique health care provider code identifying the health care provider who input the prescription information, and a patient code uniquely identifying the patient.” ([0010]).

7. The pharmacist enters a unique code identifying a prescription identifying the patient, the patient prescription information is received by the pharmacy system from the host, and the prescription is filled by the pharmacist. Subsequently, a confirmation code indicative of a prescription being filled is entered into the system by the pharmacist and sent to the host. ([0041]).

8. The system determines whether or not the data received are valid based upon querying the prescription database. When the information received from the pharmacy system corresponds to prescription information maintained in the host system, a signal identifying a valid prescription is sent to either a health care provider or back to the pharmacy system. Conversely, when the information received from the pharmacy system does not correspond to the prescription information in the host system, a signal identifying an invalid prescription is sent. ([0053]).

Borsand

9. Borsand is directed to a pharmaceutical information tracking system which can check for unfavorable pharmaceutical interactions and allergic reactions, prevent misuse of a prescription, monitor the filling and re-filling of a prescription, as well as cancel a prescription after it has been issued by a provider. (Abstract).

10. Borsand allows users to monitor pharmacists to prevent changes made to a medical prescription that would alter the filled prescription from the original prescription. Specifically, Borsand discloses that, “it would be desirable if a pharmacist could be prevented from filling a prescription at half strength but twice the volume and cost. It would also be desirable if a [sic] pharmacists could be prevented from filling redundant prescriptions from two or more providers.” ([0005]).

11. The pharmacist can modify the prescription after reviewing the prescription as it relates to pharmaceutical interactions, allergies, or other patient attributes that could affect the desirability of filling a particular prescription. ([0087]).

12. The pharmacist enters an electronic representation of a filled prescription into the system once the pharmacist has evaluated the prescription in the context of any attributes or characteristics that could impact the desirability of a particular pharmaceutical. ([0084], [0085] and [0086]).

13. Prescription information includes strength, quantity and the directions for taking the pharmaceutical. ([0064]).

Keresman

14. Keresman is directed to a method of processing drug prescriptions over a network. Each user accesses the network using an account which may be authenticated using biometric techniques. ([0050]).

PRINCIPLES OF LAW

During examination of a patent application, pending claims are given their broadest reasonable construction consistent with the specification. *In re Prater*, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404 (CCPA 1969); *In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr.*, 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

Limitations appearing in the specification but not recited in the claim are not read into the claim. *E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp.*, 343 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (claims must be interpreted “in view of the specification” without importing limitations from the specification into the claims unnecessarily).

Although a patent applicant is entitled to be his or her own lexicographer of patent claim terms, in ex parte prosecution it must be within limits. *In re Corr*, 347 F.2d 578, 580 (CCPA 1965). The applicant must do so by placing such definitions in the specification with sufficient clarity to provide a person of ordinary skill in the art with clear and precise notice of the meaning that is to be construed. *See also In re Paulsen*, 30 F.3d 1475, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (although an inventor is free to define the specific terms used to describe the invention, this must be done with reasonable clarity, deliberateness, and precision; where an inventor chooses to give terms uncommon meanings, the inventor must set out any uncommon

definition in some manner within the patent disclosure so as to give one of ordinary skill in the art notice of the change).

“Section 103 forbids issuance of a patent when ‘the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.’” *KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.*, 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations including (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) any differences between the claimed subject matter and the prior art, (3) the level of skill in the art, and (4) where in evidence, so-called secondary considerations. *Graham v. John Deere Co.*, 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966). *See also KSR*, 550 U.S. at 407 (“While the sequence of these questions might be reordered in any particular case, the [Graham] factors continue to define the inquiry that controls.”)

In *KSR*, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.” *KSR*, 550 U.S. at 407. The Court explained:

When a work is available in one field of endeavor, design incentives and other market forces can prompt variations of it, either in the same field or a different one. If a person of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability. For the same reason, if a technique has been used to improve one device, and a person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious unless its actual application is beyond his or her skill.

Id. at 417.

The operative question in this “functional approach” is thus “whether the improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established functions.” *Id.* In rejecting claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), the examiner bears the initial burden of establishing a *prima facie* case of obviousness. *In re Oetiker*, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992). *See also In re Piasecki*, 745 F.2d 1468, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Only if this initial burden is met does the burden of coming forward with evidence or argument shift to the Appellants. *In re Oetiker*, 977 F.2d at 1445. *See also In re Piasecki*, 745 F.2d at 1472. Obviousness is then determined on the basis of the evidence as a whole and the relative persuasiveness of the arguments. *See Oetiker*, 977 F.2d at 1445; *see also In re Piasecki*, 745 F.2d at 1472.

In making a rejection, however, an examiner may “take notice of facts beyond the record which, while not generally notorious, are capable of such instant and unquestionable demonstration as to defy dispute.” *In re Ahlert*, 424 F.2d 1088, 1091 (CCPA 1970) (*citing In re Knapp-Monarch Co.*, 296 F.2d 230 (CCPA 1961)).

ANALYSIS

ISSUE 1

Claims 1-6, 8-9 and 12-18 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Denny and Borsand.

Independent claims 1 and 12

Appellants argue with regard to claim 1, “[t]he Denny reference makes no disclosure concerning the step of analyzing the pharmacists’ change to see if it is merely justifiable discretion or an unjustifiable mistake. (Br. 6). Similarly, with regard to claim 12, Appellants argue, “the Denny and Borsand references fail to disclose anything about analyzing the pharmacist’s actions to determine if the change made by the pharmacist was either justified or not justified.” (Br. 9). We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments and find that Appellants’ Specification provides no lexicographic definition for the terms “justifiable,” “unjustifiable” or “discretion.” We find the usual and customary meaning of justifiable to mean a valid decision, and unjustifiable to be an invalid decision. Additionally, we find the term discretion to mean acting on one’s own. (FF 1, 2, 3, 4).

Accordingly, since neither claims 1 nor 12 provide a clear boundary as to the scope of what justifiable, unjustifiable or discretion consists of, and the Specification provides no clear definition, we construe the limitations according to their broadest reasonable interpretation as either a valid or an invalid decision made by the pharmacist. (FF 1, 2, 3, 4). Further, although claims 1 and 12 are of similar scope, claim 12 differs in that it assumes the pharmacist uses discretion. However, since we believe the claims to be of commensurate scope notwithstanding their wording, and Appellants have presented the same arguments for both independent claims, we will address the claims and their arguments together.

We find that Denny discloses a system which determines whether or not the data received from a pharmacist are valid based upon querying the prescription database. After this determination, a signal is sent identifying whether or not the information received from the pharmacy system corresponds to prescription information maintained in the host system. (FF 8). In other words, we find that Denny analyzes the prescription filled by the pharmacist to determine whether the prescription filled is valid or invalid based upon the prescribed prescription. (FF 8). Thus, based upon the lack of specific lexicographic definitions in Appellants' Specification for the terms justifiable, unjustifiable and discretion, we find the combination of Denny and Borsand makes claims 1 and 12 obvious. Therefore, Appellants' argument is not persuasive as to error in the rejection.

Additionally, Appellants argue that Denny makes no disclosure of entering any form of information regarding how a pharmacist may have changed the prescription. (Br. 6). We do not find this argument persuasive and find that Denny allows a pharmacist to enter a confirmation code indicative of a prescription being filled into the system. (FF 7). This confirmation code, indicative of a filled prescription, is received by the host system and then compared against the prescription information maintained at the host to determine whether the prescription filled matches the original prescription prescribed. (FF 7, 8). Thus, contrary to Appellants' assertion that, "[Denny] makes absolutely no disclosure concerning entering information about how a prescription was actually altered and filled by a pharmacist into a database" (Br. 7), Denny does indeed enter into a database information about how a prescription was actually filled. (FF 6, 7, 8).

Therefore, since Denny enters information about how a prescription was filled, this prescription information would also include how a prescription was actually altered by the pharmacist if the pharmacist was required to do so.

Even assuming that Denny does not explicitly disclose entering any form of information regarding how a pharmacist may have changed the prescription, the rejection is based on the combination of Denny and Borsand. We find that Borsand teaches that a pharmacist can modify the prescribed prescription after reviewing the prescription as it relates to any pharmaceutical interactions, allergies, or other patient attributes that could affect the desirability of filling that prescription. (FF 11). Additionally, Borland discloses that a pharmacist enters an electronic representation of a filled prescription once the pharmacist has evaluated the prescription. (FF 12). A person of ordinary skill in the art would appreciate from a reading of Denny and Borsand, that in order to transmit a signal identifying whether a prescription filled is valid or invalid based upon whether or not the data received from the pharmacist match the original prescription prescribed in the host database (FF 8), the pharmacist must enter information regarding how a prescription filled may have been altered from the original prescription prescribed. Thus, a person of ordinary skill in the art would have known from Borsand that the information entered includes strength, quantity and any alterations or modifications made to the prescription by the pharmacist (FF 11, 12, 13), and applied this technique to Denny when entering any form of information regarding how a pharmacist may have

changed the prescription. (FF 6, 7, 8). Therefore, Appellants' argument is not persuasive as to error in the rejection.

Lastly, Appellants argue that Denny and Borsand make no disclosure concerning the creation of a warning if the changes made by a pharmacist were unjustified. We disagree with Appellants' arguments and find that Denny discloses that when the prescription information received from the pharmacist does not correspond to the prescribed prescription maintained in the host system a signal is generated. (FF 8). We interpret this signal, which indicates that the prescription information is invalid, to be equivalent to a warning as claimed by Appellants in claims 1 and 12. Accordingly, Appellants' argument is not persuasive as to error in the rejection.

ISSUE 2

Claims 10, 11, 19 and 20 rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Denny, Borsand and Keresman.

Appellants' argue that Keresman, "does not disclose or suggest any system where a pharmacist enters information regarding how the pharmacist altered a prescription." (Br. 10). We disagree with Appellants' argument and agree with Examiner's findings that the Keresman reference shows "the use of biometric identification of registered doctors, pharmacies, and other participants is well known in the prescription drug fulfillment art." (Ans. 16). Contrary to Appellants' argument, the Examiner has cited to the combination of Denny and Borsand to disclose a system where a pharmacist enters

information regarding how the pharmacist altered a prescription. (FF 6, 7, 8).

The Examiner has provided an articulated reasoning with rational underpinning for why a person with ordinary skill in the art would modify the combination of Denny and Borsand, which discloses a system where a pharmacist enters information regarding how the pharmacist altered a prescription discussed *supra*, to use the biometric authentication features found in Keresman. (FF 14). Thus, a person with ordinary skill in the art would know from the biometric authentication taught in Keresman to apply this technique to the combination of Denny and Borsand since all the references relate to prescription fulfillment systems. (FF 7, 9, 14). Therefore, Appellants' argument is not persuasive as to error in the rejection.

Claims 2-6, 8-9, and 13-18

Appellants do not separately argue claims 2-6, 8-9, and 13-18 depending from claims 1 and 12 respectively, and so have not sustained their burden of showing that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 2-6, 8-9, and 13-18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as unpatentable over Denny and Borsand for the same reasons we found as to claims 1 and 12, *supra*.

CONCLUSION OF LAW

We conclude that Appellants have not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1-6, 8-9, and 12-18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Denny in view of Borsand. Additionally, we conclude

that Appellants have not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 10-11 and 19-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Denny, Borsand and Keresman.

DECISION

The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1-6, 8-9, and 12-18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Denny in view of Borsand and claims 10-11 and 19-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Denny, Borsand and Keresman is AFFIRMED.

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv)(2007).

AFFIRMED

saw

cc:

Eric A. LaMork
P.O. Box 434
Yardley, PA 19067-8434

OFFICE EDITION

Webster's II

The Dictionary You Need!

Clear, concise definitions

Over 1,200 new words and senses

Updated biographical and geographical sections

Illuminating, in-depth word histories

Synonyms, tables, illustrations, and more!

THIRD EDITION

Based on *Webster's II New College Dictionary, Third Edition*

Based on the hardcover edition of
Webster's II New College Dictionary, Third Edition

Words are included in this Dictionary on the basis of their usage. Words that are known to have current trademark registrations are shown with an initial capital and are also identified as trademarks. No investigation has been made of common-law trademark rights in any word, because such investigation is impracticable. The inclusion of any word in this Dictionary is not, however, an expression of the Publisher's opinion as to whether or not it is subject to proprietary rights. Indeed, no definition in this Dictionary is to be regarded as affecting the validity of any trademark.

Copyright © 2005 by Houghton Mifflin Company.
All rights reserved.

No part of this work may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by any information storage or retrieval system without the prior written permission of Houghton Mifflin Company unless such copying is expressly permitted by federal copyright law. Address inquiries to Reference Permissions, Houghton Mifflin Company, 222 Berkeley Street, Boston, MA 02116.

Visit our website: www.houghtonmifflinbooks.com

ISBN-13: 978-0-618-55205-4
ISBN-10: 0-618-55205-7

Manufactured in the United States of America

Text design by Joyce C. Weston

QWB 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Contents

| | |
|---------------------------------------|---------|
| Abbreviations Used in This Dictionary | iv |
| Key to Pronunciation | vi |
| DICTIONARY | 1 |
| Abbreviations | 823 |
| Biographical Names | 832 |
| Geographical Names | 857 |
| Tables | |
| Bible | 71 |
| Currency | 180-181 |
| Measurement | 442-443 |

junior high school n. A school that grades 7th, 8th, and sometimes 9th grades.

junk (jungk) n. 1. An unprepossessing tree or shrub of the genus *Juglans*, having scale-like, often prickly foliage, fragrant wood, and bluish-gray berries.

junk? (jungk?) v. 1. Discarded material such as glass, paper, rags, and metal that can be used for fuel or as scrap. 2. *Informal.* Something fit to be discarded: trash. 3. *Informal.* Nonsense. 4. *Slang.* Heroin. —*To throw away as trash.*

junket (jungk'et) n. A Chinese flatbottom ship with barned sails.

junk bond n. A corporate bond having a high yield and high risk.

junket (jungk'et) n. 1. A custardlike dessert of fruit and cream with rum. 2. A party, banquet, or outing. 3. A trip taken by an official and paid for with public funds. —*junket* n. —*junketer* n.

ju-va-nee (yoo'və-nē) n. A transitional stage between the meanings "a food" and "a trip" for junket is found in the meaning "picnic." The most recent sense, "a trip taken by a public official at public expense," developed in the US and has acquired decidedly negative connotations.

junk food n. A high-calorie food that is low in nutritional value.

junkie (jungk'ē) n. p. *Am. Slang.* 1. A drug addict, esp. one using heroin. 2. One with a consuming interest in something. *—Soap opera junkie.*

junk-mail n. 1. An unwanted or unsolicited item, esp. an advertisement mailed in bulk. 2. *Informal.* Junk, as scrap metal, that can be resold.

junk-to-eque (jungk'tō-ek'ē) adj. Having a stately bearing and regal beauty.

junk-tu (jungk'ü) n. p. *Am. Slang.* 1. A drug addict, esp. one using heroin. 2. One with a consuming interest in something. *—Soap opera junkie.*

junk-yard (jungk'ē-yärd') n. The 5th planet from the sun and the largest in the solar system.

junk-yard (jungk'ē-yärd') adj. 1. Of or relating to the administration of the law. 2. *Informal.* Having authority.

junk-yard-ic (jungk'ē-yärd'ik) adj. Having the right or power to interpret and apply the law. 2. Authority or control. 3. The territorial range over which an authority extends.

—*junk-yard'ish* adj.

ju-ris-pru-dence (yoo'ris-prü-dəns) n. 1. The science or philosophy of law. 2. A division or department of law.

ju-ris-pru-dent (yoo'ris-prü-dənt) adj. 1. Of or relating to prudence or judgment. 2. Of or relating to legality or law.

ju-ri-or (yoo'ri-ər, -ör') n. One who serves on a jury.

ju-ri-or (yoo'ri-ər, -ör') n. p. *Am. Slang.* 1. A group of people called by law and sworn to hear evidence in a case and give a verdict. 2. A committee of experts called by a court to advise it on a question of law or fact.

ju-ri-or (yoo'ri-ər, -ör') adj. 1. Fair in one's dealings and actions. *<just king>* 2. Morally right. 3. Deserved: merited. *<just desert>* 4. Legitimate.

ju-ri-or (yoo'ri-ər, -ör') n. *Am. Slang.* 1. A person who is not a member of the jury. 2. *Informal.* A person who is not a member of the jury.

ju-ri-or (yoo'ri-ər, -ör') n. 1. The administration of law. 2. A judge.

ju-ri-or (yoo'ri-ər, -ör') n. A local magistrate empowered to try minor cases, administer oaths, and perform marriages.

ju-ri-or (yoo'ri-ər, -ör') v. *Am. Slang.* To shorten or trim (a garment) to fit. *—to adjust or (space) to the proper length in printing.* —*ju-ri'ər b'əb'əd'* adj. —*ju-ri'ər b'əb'əd'* adv. *—justification* n.

ju-ri-or (yoo'ri-ər, -ör') adj. To promote a project. —*ju-ri-or* n.

ju-ri-or (yoo'ri-ər, -ör') n. Either of 2 Asian plains *Corcorax capularis* or *C. olivaceus*, yielding a strong coarse fiber used to make mats and ropes.

ju-ri-or (yoo'ri-ər, -ör') n. A member of a Germanic people who migrated to Britain in the 5th and 6th centuries.

ju-ri-or (yoo'ri-ər, -ör') adj. 1. Not yet adult; young. 2. Childish; immature. 3. Intended or suitable for children or young persons. 4. *Informal.* A young person. 2. *Informal.* A person who is young. 3. A children's book. —*ju-ri-or-ness* n.

ju-xa-pose (yoo'zə-poz') v. *posed; posing.* To put side by side. —*ju-xa-pose* n.

k or K (kä) n. p. *k's or K's* n. 1. The 11th letter of the English alphabet. 2. A specific sound represented by the letter.

11th in a series. 4. *Computer Sci.* A unit of storage capacity equal to 1,024 bytes.

K symbol for potassium.

ka-ba-ki (kä-bä-kä') n. *Shab. Hebrew.*

ka-ba-ki (kä-bä-kä') n. *Traditional Japanese dress in which a man's and a woman's kimono are worn together.*

ka-ba-ki (kä-bä-kä') n. *A defined accessorial spirit of the Pueblo peoples.* 2. A carved doll resembling such a spirit.

ka-dash (kä-däsh') n. *A Jewish prayer recited at funerals and by mourners after the death of a relative.*

ka-fé-ka-tsch (kä-fé-kä-tsh') n. *A coffee klatch.*

ka-fé (kä-fé') n. *Am. Slang.* An open, esp. a German beer garden. —*ka-fé* n. 1870-1918.

ka-fé (kä-fé') n. A cabbage, *Brassica oleracea*, with wrinkled leaves not forming a tight head.

ka-fé (kä-fé') n. *Am. Slang.* 1. A musical instrument used to produce successive symmetric designs by means of mirrors reflecting the changing patterns made by a brazier holding a sheet of glass at the end of the tube. 2. A series of concentric circles.

ka-fé (kä-fé') n. 3. A series of changing events or phases.

ka-fé-do-scop'ic (kä-fé'dō-skōp'ik), ka-fé-do-scop'ic (kä-fé'dō-skōp'ik) adj. 1. *Informal.* Having a taste for the arts. 2. *Informal.* A person who was encouraged to make a suicidal crash on a target. 2. An aircraft loaded with explosives used in a suicide attack.

ka-ga-ri (kä-gä-ri') n. *Am. Slang.* 1. Any of various herbaceous marigolds of the family *Macropodidae*, of Australia, with short, erect, large head limbs and long, slender, drooping tails. 2. *Am. Slang.* A person who is a public nuisance.

ka-goo-roo court n. An illegal, self-appointed court, esp. one marked by dishonesty or incompetence.

ka-ho-oh also ka-ho-line (kä-hō-lēn') n. A fine clay.

ka-ho-pé (kä-hō-pé') n. A silky fiber derived from the fruit of the silk-cotton tree and used for insulation and as padding in mattresses, pillows, and bed preservers.

ka-ho-pé (kä-hō-pé') n. *Informal.* 1. Destroyed or wrecked. 2. Out of order.

ka-ho-oh or ka-ho-oh (kä-hō-ō') n. One of a race of central Asian sheep with a pelts that is coarse and brittle in the young but coarse and wavy in the adult.

ka-ho-oh (kä-hō-ō') n. A music entertainment system providing prerecorded accom-

K

panimor to songs that a performer sings live or on tape. *(käf'ər)* n. 1. A unit of measure for the fineness of gold, equal to 1/5 of the total amount of pure gold in an alloy.

ka-ra-ki (kä-rä-kä'), ka-ra-kä (kä-rä-kä') n. *A Japanese art of self-defense in which sharp blows and kicks are used to injure sensitive points of an opponent's body.*

ka-rim (kä-rim'), ka-rim' (kä-rim') n. 1. The total effect of one's conduct, believed in Buddhism to determine one's rebirth and destiny in a future life. 2. *Am. Slang.* *Awestruck.* *Area or atmosphere.* —*ka-rim'ik* (-mik) *adj.*

karat (kä-rä-t) n. An area of irregular limestone ridges and depressions, with sharp, cavates, and underground streams.

karat (kä-rä-t) n. A miniature racing car.

kar-di-dil (kä-rä-dil') n. Any of various green plants related to the grasshoppers and the crickets, having long antennae and long wings the male that make a shrill sound when rubbed together.

kar-di-dil (kä-rä-dil') n. *A waterstrider.* *Insect or Es-*

kimio cannot having a light frame covered with skin except for an opening in the center. —*kar-di-dil* n. The letter *k*.

kar-di-dil (kä-rä-dil') n. *A waterstrider.* *Insect or Es-*

kimio cannot having a light frame covered with skin except for an opening in the center. —*kar-di-dil* n. The letter *k*.

kar-di-dil (kä-rä-dil') n. *A small anchor.*

kar-di-dil (kä-rä-dil') n. *The main structural member of a ship, running sideways along the center line from stem to bow, to which the frames are attached.* 2. *A similar structure in an aircraft.* 2. *Something that resembles a keel.* —*kar-di-dil* n. 1. The backbone of a fish, esp. of a bony-finned fish. 2. The backbone of a herd. 3. *To capsize.* —*kar-di-dil* n. 1. To fall over suddenly. 2. *To faint.*

kar-di-dil (kä-rä-dil') n. *Regional.* *To make cool.*

kar-di-dil (kä-rä-dil') v. *To drag down the keel of a ship as a punishment.*

kar-el-son (kä-räl'sən, käl'sən'), kar-el-son (kä-räl'sən, käl'sən') n. *A timber fastened above and parallel to the keel to give additional strength.*

kar-el-son (kä-räl'sən, käl'sən') n. *Having a sharp edge or point.* 2. *Intellectually acute.* 3. *Slightly sensitive.* *—kar-el-son of smell?* 4. *Strong; intense.* *—kar-el-son wind?* 5. *Pungent.* 6. *Earthquake.* 7. *Stale.* 8. *Wonderful.*

kar-el-son (kä-räl'sən, käl'sən') adj. *—kar-el-son n.* *A wailing lament for the dead.*

kar-el-son (kä-räl'sən, käl'sən') v. *To have as a supply.* 3. *To provide with maintenance and support.*

—kar-el-son of a family on a small income? 4. *To be customarily kept the bread knife in the drawer?* 5. *To mind; manage.* 6. *To continue or cause to continue in a given*